Recent tensions over the shooting down of a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon have led me to consider how such tensions may escalate into a wider crisis or conflict between China and the United States. In this case, what would China want to achieve and how has the Russo-Ukraine impacted this. In fact, during the initial weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was a worry that China would in fact invade Taiwan as well. However, it was made clear that Russia was acting by itself - separate from its supposed ally. This enlightens us to the fact that Russia has in likely damaged its relationship with China and that the ‘friendship without limits’ is highly limited. Yet with this, what is the probability of an invasion of Taiwan or, more likely, a Chinese aggressive military action in the vein of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
In recent years, China has expanded its military assets and infrastructure into areas it believes that it will have to contest in the future. This includes air and helicopter ports in Xinjiang and Tibet which also contain SAM (surface to air missile) batteries and garrisons as well as highways in these regions. The country has also been building military bases in the South China Sea area including a naval base in Yalong Bay, military bases and artificial islands in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, of which some also have SAM batteries, anti-ship missile batteries and capacity for airplanes. China has also undertaken a huge expansion of its navy having already overtaken the US in the total number of ships in 2015. The current rate of expansion was explained by former Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach of the German navy when he said that ‘China is increasing the size of its navy by the equivalent of the entire French navy every four years’ or roughly 100 vessels. These cumulatively have the aim of controlling the first island chain, exerting influence over Tibet and India and expanding westwards across central Asia with the aim of eventually increasing its economic hegemony over the world and controlling the Eurasian trade routes to ensure future security and wealth. However, the goal I wish to bring to attention is the fact that China wants to control the first island chain which would allow the country to place its naval assets into the greater pacific and pressure the USA. Of course, there is whether this is even possible or will achieve anything given that the United States has several key civil and military advantages over China, not least the fact that the US is China’s main trade partner, and China needs the United States. The US has 11 supercarriers, and it doesn’t face the demographic challenges of the Chinese. Although that doesn’t mean the Chinese will not try as Russia issues in this are even more pronounced. That is the effect of an authoritarian leader who has centralised power around themselves to the extent that Putin and Xi Jingping have.
So, as we have seen, China's aims would cause significant tensions with the west as they would have to invade and occupy numerous western allies along the first island chain. Therefore, Russia already galvanising the west has reduced China’s opportunities for a surprise military action in any of the contested areas previously mentioned. This is coupled with the fact that further Russian and Chinese economic integration is not particularly advantageous to the Chinese. This is since the primary trade partner of the Chinese is the United States - as previously mentioned - who would oppose further Chinese and Russian integration with sanctions and further insulation of its own economy. Also, it is not possible for Russia to increase the amount of oil and natural gas sent to China since the expertise and infrastructure are simply not there. Also, the exit of major western oil companies and services firms has the possibility of leading to a decrease in Russian oil exports to China.
Consequently, it might be better for China to eventually occupy the Far East Areas of Russia with its far better economy and far higher population, although it is not clear how advantageous this would be to China specifically. Russia is also focused on itself anyway and would have the capabilities to help the Chinese in the Far East if it came to a global military conflict. They just do not have naval projection capabilities as their fleets are tied up in the Baltic and Black Seas and any attempt to support China in the far east would probably echo the attempts made during the Russo‐Japanese war of 1904‐1905.
As a result of the galvanising of the west in foreign policy issues, specifically America, China can’t significantly improve its Geopolitical situation with the Russo-Ukraine war meaning that this war wasn’t in their best interests. The Chinese even asked the Russians to delay their invasion until after the Winter Olympics, according to US intelligence. The US navy - even with huge Chinese naval expansion - still has 11 supercarriers. They are still available to prevent an invasion of Taiwan even with the war in Ukraine. It’s a separate issue whether China would invade Taiwan. In fact, if it would be anyone it would probably sooner be Vietnam as they are not really in the US protection sphere, and it would offer a moderately better position for the Chinese, but we all know how the United States’ attempts to invade Vietnam went. Yet China also has its own demographic time-bombs and so it may make aggressive moves like Russia’s anyway. China will at the very least continue to increase its military presence in these contested areas at a higher rate and rapidly develop its military capabilities. The Russo-Ukraine war has perhaps sped up the likelihood of China’s Southeast Asian rivals increasing their own military presence and capabilities in the contested regions to deter China from making an aggressive move as well.
Partly in response to the Ukraine crisis, Xi Jingping has publicly stated that ‘We should uphold the principle of indivisibility of security, build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, and oppose the building of national security on the basis of insecurity in other countries.’ Here, he is already preparing for increased military presence in contested areas. He also is opposing the increased insulation of the West in security matters in pacts such as the AUKUS pact to create Australian nuclear submarines as well as Quad or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue - a security dialogue between India, Japan, Australia and the United States. Overall, this sets the conditions for a retaliatory Chinese move further supporting my prediction that despite Russia’s incompetence China may move more aggressively anyway and will seek to use supposed evidence of Western aggressive to justify its own security measures. Furthermore, China may also further integrate with Putin and most recently appears to be on the brink of supplying Russia with armaments. In conclusion, despite moderately hampering Chinese geopolitical aims, this war may ultimately speed up the rate at which Xi goes for a risky and aggressive military action - much like Putin.